It is generally agreed that VANET security needs to rely on entity-centric trust, as well as data-centric methods. Entitycentric trust typically involves signatures and certificates, while data-centric methods leverage on consistency checks. One way to implement data consistency checking is to exploit redundant information dissemination to detect inconsistencies. In this paper, we propose a metric to investigate the degree of redundancy that different types of information dissemination protocols exhibit. We evaluate our metric using simulations of Geocast and aggregation protocols. Results show that geocast largely eliminates redundancy, whereas aggregation keeps more redundant communication paths.
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) have received increasing attention from academia and industry alike. Foreseen applications include safety warnings, traffic efficiency enhancements, and multimedia services. Numerous protocols have been proposed to provide the necessary information dissemination. For some applications, information about the 1-hop broadcast area around a vehicle is sufficient. Other applications, especially those for navigation support, need to disseminate information in larger areas. Schoch et al. [6] propose a categorization of dissemination protocols, differentiating single-hop beaconing, multihop Geocast, advanced information dissemination, and innetwork aggregation. We focus on the last three categories, which all disseminate information in a multi-hop fashion in larger areas.
Security is generally acknowledged as a primary challenge in VANETs [4, 2] . The original approach to protect vehicular communication is based on entity-centric trust, which is established by signing packets with ECDSA signatures and by establishing a public key infrastructure that issues certificates to vehicles. This approach is currently being standardized as IEEE 1609.2.
Entity-centric trust ensures that the originators of messages are actual vehicles or authorized infrastructure. However, prohibitive cost and complex management of trusted hardware make it likely that knowledgable attackers will be able to access key material in vehicles they physically own. Entity-centric trust does not protect from data alteration attacks mounted by such insider attackers. Using obtained key pairs, attackers can either maliciously generate wrong information or modify information they process as part of multi-hop dissemination protocols.
Therefore, research papers [5, 3] , as well as standardization activities (e. g., IEEE 1609.2) propose to complement entity-centric trust with data-centric methods to check for consistency. The central idea is to rely on physical models, local sensors, or data redundancy to detect spurious data.
Various approaches leveraging on physical models and local sensors have been investigated. However, these proposals focus mainly on single-hop applications and corresponding dissemination protocols.
In this paper, we assess data consistency approaches based on data redundancy. Our goal is to analyze whether the redundancy present in current protocol proposals can be exploited to achieve data consistency in multi-hop dissemination protocols.
REDUNDANCY METRICS
We represent the communication network with a directed graph G = (V, E) where vertices represent vehicles and edges represent that a vehicle is within 1-hop communication range of another vehicle. Information that is observed by a source s ∈ V is forwarded over multiple forwarding nodes f1, . . . , fm ∈ V to a destination d. To compensate packet loss, protocols often forward information using multiple paths from s to d. For the transfer of a single message, we distinguish two subgraphs of G, namely Gs and
We use Gs = (Vs, Es) to represent all transfers of a single message, that is, all forwarding paths starting at s. Hence, (vi, vj) ∈ Es if, and only if, vi forwards the message, which vj then receives. Vs contains all vertices in V that are connected to an edge in Es. Further,
) and E (s,d) contain all vertices and edges that are part of a path from s to d in Gs. Ideally, d receives the message unmodified via all paths. Due to transmission errors, as well as malicious vehicles, some of the received messages might be modified.
We assume a single insider attacker a ∈ V \ {s, d} in the network whose goal is to alter the message that is transferred from s to d who are both honest. That is, whenever a receives s' message for forwarding, a will modify it. We assume that we cannot distinguish a from normal vehicles beforehand, because the attacker vehicle creates messages that conform to the communication protocol and, in general, behaves according to the protocol except for modifying message content. Moreover, we assume that d does not know s' identity beforehand. Because honest nodes modify forwarded information in advanced dissemination protocols such as in-network aggregation, we cannot assume that a can be detected using entity-centric methods alone. We consider a to be successful if a is able to modify all copies of the message that d receives from s. In order to be successful, a needs to be in V (s,d) and part of all possible paths from s to d in G (s,d) . A message transfer is called attackable if there exists at least one a ∈ V (s,d) \ {s, d} such that for all paths p from s to d in G (s,d) , a is on p.
Node-disjoint paths
We use the number of node-disjoint paths (P) to characterize how resilient a message transfer is against insider attackers. If a node exists that is part of all paths between s and d, then G (s,d) becomes disconnected after removing this node. Thus, the size of the graph's minimum vertex cut is one. Applying Menger's theorems, that means that the number of node-disjoint paths between s and d in G (s,d) is equal to 1. We can use maximum flow algorithms to compute the number of node-disjoint paths efficiently. Figure 1 shows an example graph with one node-disjoint path.
If a protocol is not attackable, there are at least two paths from s to d that have no common nodes apart from s and d. However, for P = 2, it is still undecidable which node is the attacker. For P ≥ 3, an attacker can be detected given an honest majority. However, a straight-forward majority vote is not possible in all network topologies, because even a single attacker can control a large share of incoming edges to the destination d.
Critical nodes
In case we have P = 1, there is at least one node in the network that can successfully attack the message transfer from s to d. However, not all nodes on the node-disjoint path between s and d can attack successfully. Therefore, we calculate the critical nodes (C) on the path between s and d. A node is critical if its removal would disconnect G (s,d) , as shown in Figure 1 . In case P ≥ 2, the number of critical nodes is automatically 0. The more nodes on the path between s and d are in the set of critical nodes, the more likely it is that an attacker that is randomly positioned in the network is successful. Namely, the chance of success is
Together, P and C describe the trade-off between communication efficiency and attack resilience due to redundancy.
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
To validate our metrics, we apply them to widely-used multi-hop data dissemination protocols. We implemented representatives of the following protocol families.
Baseline. As baseline we use a graph that resembles the result of a naïve flooding with perfect packet delivery even over multiple hops. The baseline gives an estimate of the maximum achievable redundancy.
Geocast. We use an adaptive, probabilistic gossiping protocol, namely Advanced Adaptive Geocast (AAG) [1] . In AAG, each node determines the message forwarding probability based on the current perceived node density according to 2-hop neighborhood information.
Aggregation. We use a basic aggregation scheme as representative for in-network aggregation protocols. The scheme uses fixed size road segments, for which all atomic observations are averaged. For calculating our metrics, we assume that a message from the source reaches the destination if the destination receives an aggregate that the source message contributed to.
Our simulations are done using JiST/SWANS. 1 We consider both city and highway scenarios with changing node density. For the city scenario simulations, we place all nodes randomly on a pre-defined road network. For the highway scenario simulations, nodes are randomly distributed on a single stretch of road. We do not consider node mobility at this point, because we focus on single message transfers between a source and destination and can assume that the basic network characteristics, e. g., node density, remain the same during one message transfer. Figure 2 shows the number of node-disjoint paths in a city with varying node density. For the baseline, P grows linearly in the number of nodes, which is expected, because the graph is more connected with higher node density. For the aggregation protocol, the number of disjoint paths grows as well, but at a lower rate. Figure 3 shows that the number of critical nodes C = 0 for the baseline. For the aggregation protocol, C also converges to 0 as the node density grows. The results for AAG in Figure 2 show a much lower number of node-disjoint paths, which stays constant with growing !!! "# Figure 2 : Number of node-disjoint paths P for different node densities in a city. ! Figure 3 : Number of critical nodes C for different node densities in a city.
numbers of nodes. This is due to the fact that AAG automatically reduces redundancy by lowering the forwarding probability in high node density scenarios. Consequently, Figure 3 shows a higher number of critical nodes for AAG.
In the highway scenario, we see similar results for all protocols. However, the aggregation protocol performs almost equal to the baseline in the highway case. The reason is that the aggregation protocol needs to disseminate only 10 segments in the highway scenario because the highway only consists of a single stretch of road.
We observe that for AAG, all metrics are consistent for both city and highway scenario, as well as for different node densities. In all settings, AAG performs almost optimal in terms of communication efficiency. However, the low redundancy due to efficient communication comes at the cost of possible attacks. Aggregation shows a high level of redundancy for all scenarios. However, aggregation only disseminates summarized information. As a result, the utility of the disseminated information may be lower. Moreover, the aggregation protocol's performance decreases notably in a city scenario, illustrating the drawbacks of a fixed segments scheme.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Data consistency is an important building block for secure vehicular communication systems. Focusing on entity-based solutions backed by a public key infrastructure, data consistency measures have been widely neglected by existing research. We argue that redundant forwarding paths are a promising technique to enable consistency checks especially in multi-hop data dissemination protocols.
Previous research on such multi-hop dissemination protocols has focused on aspects like communication efficiency, therefore aiming to remove any dissemination redundancy. We complement this research by analyzing how likely it is for a randomly selected unknown attacker to dominate all paths from a source to a destination. Our metrics, the number of node-disjoint paths and the derived number of critical nodes, are efficient to compute due to their relation to the well-researched maximum flow problem in graph theory.
We validate our metrics using simulations in different scenarios. Our results show that AAG, an efficient Geocast protocol, reduces communication redundancy to a point that enables single attackers to fully control the information flow between a vehicle pair in certain scenarios. We therefore conclude that current routing protocols will have to be modified to deal with attacks on data consistency. A simple aggregation protocol shows more promising results in terms of redundancy. Ideally, future protocols will optimize path redundancy and bandwidth consumption at the same time.
We are currently extending our metrics to accomplish more complex attacker models. In addition, we are assessing protocols that use this conflict detection as a baseline to identify the spurious information in conflict situations.
